Russia
Source: brics-plus-analytics.org

With all the discussions about BRICS institutionalization taking on greater momentum – the group’s institutionalization was singled out as a key priority in the past several BRICS summit declarations – one of the more exciting questions in these debates may be the expediency of the establishment of permanent headquarters for the bloc. Even more fascinating and far-reaching may be the choice of the location of the BRICS Headquarters and Secretariat. After all, this choice may reveal the bloc’s key priorities in terms of its future regional development and expansion. While we explored at length the case for and against BRICS institutionalization, we now focus on the issue of the location of a possible BRICS headquarters/institutions.

Thus far discussions on the headquarters of the bloc have not featured in public discussions and it is far from clear as to whether the choice in favor of establishing a permanent headquarters is going to be made at all. Yet, if BRICS institutionalization is to advance in the coming years, such a scenario of the creation of a permanent Secretariat may become an increasingly likely prospect. Indeed, at the recent summit of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), one of the key messages was the bloc’s prioritization of institutionalization, including “through the establishment of an effective RCEP Secretariat”. So what are the options?

Within the grand scheme of things, the choice may revolve around the three main regions of the Global South – Africa, Latin America and Eurasia. Each of the three options has its economic rationale, well beyond the many political and/or short-term considerations that may also be thrown into the boiling pot of this BRICS+ debate:

• Africa: the future generations argument. The future of the global economy will be increasingly tied to Africa as a growing share of the young population will come from that continent. According to the IMF, “by 2030, half of all new entrants into the global labor force will come from sub-Saharan Africa”[1]. Africa as a whole will deliver the largest contribution to global population growth in the coming decades, with its share in global population expected to reach a quarter by 2050 and 40% by 2100[2]. Furthermore, 13 out of 20 largest cities in the world by 2100 are to be concentrated in Africa, including all of the top-3 positions in this ranking[3]. A rising share of the global youth, global population and global human capital – this is the case for Africa in its simplest form.
• Eurasia: the center of gravity argument. Most of the bloc’s heavyweights such as India, China, Russia, Indonesia are based in Eurasia. Furthermore, a significant majority of BRICS core members as well as the members of the expanded BRICS+ together with the partnership belt come from Eurasia. The bulk of trade and investment flows in the BRICS+ domain are concentrated in Eurasia.
• Latin America: the new frontiers argument. Latin America has the lowest representation in the BRICS core and in the expanded BRICS+ with the partnership circle. At the same time, Latin America is witnessing heated debates on the merits of joining BRICS, with Argentina being the only invited country to reject the invitation so far. Latin America also has significant scope to expand regional integration as well as boost South-South trade (intra-continental and inter-continental) from rather subdued levels currently. If BRICS is to build bridges of economic cooperation with Latin America and become more inclusive as a bloc of the Global South, this region of the world economy merits greater prioritization in BRICS institutionalization efforts.

There may be still other arguments and rationales such as symbolism and Global South history, which would argue in favor of cities such as Bandung (Indonesia) that held the historic conference 70 years ago marking earlier initiatives of the Global South to change the course of global development. Another possible perspective would be to designate next-generation inland locations for BRICS Headquarters that could serve as drivers of national economic development and greater connectivity across the Global South. Whichever of the above arguments is made, however, I would not venture as to make a definitive and exclusive choice between the three regions/centers of the Global South – Africa, Latin America and Eurasia – as it is crucial that no part of the developing world is left out from the institutional development of the BRICS bloc.

But, perhaps, there is a way for the BRICS to innovate in the sphere of institutionalization and position the various branches of BRICS emerging institutions in all the three regions of the Global South. For example (and this is a very tentative and hypothetical scenario), the BRICS Secretariat could be located in Eurasia, the BRICS Parliament/Parliamentary Assembly (if ever created[4]) in Africa and the legal mechanism for resolving trade/investment disputes[5] in Latin America. Instead of divisions, the BRICS institutionalization (spanning the executive, legislative/parliamentary and judicial spheres) could thus advance inclusivity and equal participation of all of the main regions of the developing world.

In fact, this geographical diversity of the emerging BRICS institutional framework may be already deduced to some degree from the evolution and expansion in the operations of the New Development Bank. In particular, we note the creation of the regional centers of BRICS NDB in the main regions of the Global South (Eurasia, Africa, Latin America) and member economies of the BRICS-5.

This scope for greater geographical divergence in the institutional development of BRICS may be even more impressive if BRICS opted to forge ahead with the creation of a full-fledged BRICS CRA – an arrangement that if institutionalized would need to be headquartered closer to the recipients in Latin America or in Africa. Other potential institutional mechanisms include the headquarters for the BRICS grain exchange (to be headquartered likely in economies that are leading producers) or the newly created BRICS Multilateral Guarantees (BMG) mechanism that is to operate within the framework of NDB but could be headquartered in Latin America with coordination from the local regional office of the Bank.

And there may be many more platforms that are sectoral (for example potential platforms for producers of precious metals) or regional in scope (such as the BRICS forum for municipalities) that if institutionalized would add to the variety of BRICS geographical mosaic. This geographical diversity in the BRICS emerging institutional framework stands in stark contrast to the limited variety of locations in the current status-quo system dominated by the US East Coast (UN in New York and the Bretton Woods institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank based in Washington DC) and a number of locations in Europe (WTO in Geneva). 

In the end, I have to emphasize yet again that it is still very much an open question whether the BRICS bloc will in fact opt to create its own Headquarters and Secretariat. After all, the BRICS have not yet exhausted the scope for exploiting the myriads of economic cooperation formats (such as platforms and alliances between regional integration blocs) that do not require the operation of a Secretariat. Nonetheless, the winds of change in the Global South do point towards greater coordination, and the greater the challenges posed to BRICS as a bloc, the greater the likelihood of an accelerated pace in the group’s institutionalization.

[1] https://www.imf.org/en/blogs/articles/2024/11/12/the-clock-is-ticking-on-sub-saharan-africas-urgent-job-creation-challenge
[2] Andrew Stanley. African century. Finance and Development. September 2023, pp. 16-17
[3] https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/07/by-2100-none-of-the-worlds-biggest-cities-will-be-in-china-the-us-or-europe/
[4] https://brics.br/en/news/the-brics-parliamentary-forum-advocates-for-a-new-global-order-with-enhanced-leadership-from-the-global-south
[5] https://www.bricscompetition.org/about/who-we-are

Yaroslav Lissovolik, Founder, BRICS+ Analytics

Germany
Source: caucasuswatch.de

Iran’s formal accession to BRICS+ in 2024 represented an important diplomatic signal — the culmination of Tehran’s long-standing efforts to align more closely with emerging economies outside the Western sphere. The move was widely interpreted as an attempt to strengthen Iran’s global relevance, diversify economic partnerships, and gain political legitimacy amid continued sanctions.

While membership has given Iran a broader platform for dialogue, the material benefits remain limited. This article examines the economic and geopolitical implications of Iran’s BRICS+ membership, with a particular focus on its effects in the South Caucasus, where overlapping transport corridors and political dynamics shape regional connectivity.

1. The Nature of BRICS+: Cooperation Without Integration

The expanded BRICS grouping — comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the UAE — collectively represents about 40% of global GDP (PPP) and over 40% of the world’s population (BRICS Portal, 2025).

Despite its impressive scope, BRICS+ remains a consultative platform rather than an integrated economic union. It lacks a common currency, trade policy, or collective sanctions mechanism. Its main financial body, the New Development Bank, lends selectively and has shown caution toward high-risk or sanctioned economies such as Iran.

According to Professor Heinz Gärtner, political scientist at the University of Vienna and Senior Research Advisor at the International Institute for Peace, “BRICS+ provides Iran with visibility and networking opportunities, but not with institutional protection or direct economic relief.”

The comparison with Iran’s earlier membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2023 is instructive. Like the SCO, BRICS+ enhances Iran’s diplomatic presence but stops short of altering its macroeconomic realities.

2. Economic Outcomes: Sanctions and Structural Dependence

Iran continues to operate within the constraints of U.S. and reactivated U.N. sanctions, which limit its access to global finance and technology. Oil remains its primary source of income.

• Oil exports averaged 1.63 million barrels per day in the first half of 2025 (Iran Oil & Gas), primarily sold to China.
• Petroleum-product exports fell by 25% (≈ US $ 2.5 billion) between March and August 2025 (Trend.az).
• Inflation remains around 40–42%, while the rial continues to depreciate (IMF World Economic Outlook 2025).

The persistence of secondary sanctions discourages even sympathetic partners from deepening cooperation. As Professor Gärtner notes: “Most states prefer limited engagement with Iran to avoid exposure to secondary sanctions. BRICS+ membership does not remove that risk.”

While Tehran emphasizes alternative payment mechanisms using local currencies (yuan, ruble, dirham), such arrangements remain small in volume and heavily dependent on the policies of partner states.

3. Regional Dimension: The South Caucasus in Iran’s Strategy

Iran’s regional policy views the South Caucasus as a key transit and security zone connecting the Persian Gulf with the Black Sea and Eurasian markets. The International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is central to this vision. Studies of the corridor estimate that it can cut shipping time between India and Russia from roughly 45–60 days (via the Suez Canal) to about 25–30 days, and lower transport costs by around 30%, by shifting cargo to a 7,200 km multimodal route linking Indian ports, Iran, the Caspian basin, and Russia. (World Bank via Debuglies).

Armenia: A Cooperative Partner

For Armenia, Iran offers a route toward diversification and greater connectivity. Bilateral trade reached US $ 370 million in 2022 (Trading Economics), mainly in electricity, construction materials, and gas exchange. The two governments continue discussing transport and energy initiatives that could strengthen Armenia’s north–south links.

Armenia’s approach remains pragmatic: cooperation with Iran complements, rather than replaces, partnerships with the EU, U.S., and India. This multi-vector policy allows Yerevan to pursue infrastructure modernization while maintaining regional stability.

Azerbaijan: Parallel Connectivity Strategies

Relations between Iran and Azerbaijan remain marked by cautious cooperation and underlying sensitivities. Both countries support trade and energy exchanges, but their corridor priorities differ:

• Iran promotes north–south connectivity through its own territory (INSTC).
• Azerbaijan focuses on east–west links between the Caspian, Türkiye, and Europe.

These strategies are not inherently contradictory; they represent differing economic orientations. Tehran’s influence over the design of regional corridors, however, remains modest. External actors — particularly the U.S., EU, and Russia — continue to shape major infrastructure and energy decisions.

As Gärtner observes: “Iran’s role in the South Caucasus is that of a participant, not a driver. The region has become a space of shared influence among multiple powers.”

4. External Dynamics: Russia and China as Selective Partners

Within BRICS+, Russia and China remain Iran’s most significant partners, but both act according to their own strategic and economic interests.

• China maintains a risk-averse policy, focusing on stable oil imports and gradual investments under the Belt and Road framework.
• Russia, facing its own sanctions, demonstrates greater political alignment with Tehran and may expand cooperation in nuclear energy, logistics, and infrastructure.

Yet neither Moscow nor Beijing is willing to substitute for Western financial access or absorb secondary sanctions risks on Iran’s behalf. The partnerships are therefore instrumental rather than transformative.

5. Future Prospects

Iran’s BRICS+ membership demonstrates diplomatic persistence but does not fundamentally alter its economic constraints. The country has gained access to dialogue, not structural integration. Its ability to influence South Caucasus developments will depend less on its membership status and more on its capacity to deliver reliable connectivity, energy stability, and predictable partnerships.

For Armenia, cooperation with Iran remains a pragmatic component of diversification efforts. For Azerbaijan, BRICS+ expands Iran’s visibility but does not directly alter regional power dynamics. For Iran, the challenge is to convert symbolic participation into measurable outcomes — a task complicated by sanctions, limited financial transparency, and global risk perceptions.

As Professor Gärtner concludes: “Iran’s return to high-level forums is significant, yet its influence remains conditional — dependent on its ability to manage external pressure and deliver internal reforms.”

Contributed by Siranush Grigoryan, a Lecturer at Armenian National Polytechnic University.

USA
Source: peoplesdispatch.org

The former Brazilian president spoke at the COP30 Heads of State Summit and linked social justice to the fight against the climate crisis.

Pointing to the impacts already caused by the climate crisis such as floods, agricultural losses, and food insecurity, Dilma stressed that developing countries are the most affected. Photo: Paulo Mumia/COP30

The president of the New Development Bank (NDB), Dilma Rousseff, said on November 6 that the institution she leads is ready to finance projects promoting a just transition focused on innovation, environmental protection, and social development. Her remarks came during her speech at the opening session of the Heads of State Summit of the UN Climate Conference (COP), held in Belém, Pará.

As the final speaker of the inaugural plenary, Dilma reminded attendees that the Amazonian city hosting the conference “reminds us, forcefully, that protecting nature and promoting human well-being are inseparable tasks.” According to her, the future of humanity is directly tied to the decisions being made today.

Pointing to the impacts already caused by the climate crisis such as floods, agricultural losses, and food insecurity, Dilma stressed that developing countries are the most affected. “We know that it is the poorest who suffer the most,” she said.

Climate finance in local currencies

In her speech, Dilma argued that climate action must be linked to a broader strategy for social progress, one that includes jobs, innovation, and protection for the most vulnerable. She said the NDB is committed to supporting member countries through financing on more favorable terms.

“For every megawatt of clean energy financed, for every hectare restored, for every community lifted out of environmental vulnerability, we are expressing our commitment to a just transition,” she said. Dilma emphasized that the bank will act as a multilateral partner by expanding climate financing, boosting the diffusion of green technologies, and offering solutions in local currencies.

The emphasis on using national currencies instead of the dollar has been a recurring theme in Dilma’s speeches. In July, she stated that “financing denominated in local currencies helps mitigate exchange-rate risks” and makes credit more accessible for developing countries.

The proposal is part of the bank’s strategy to strengthen the autonomy of Global South nations amid geopolitical instability. Dilma said that “geopolitical conflicts, wars, protectionism, and financial instability” have eroded global trust and hindered the flow of resources and technology precisely when international cooperation is most needed.

In this context, she affirmed that the NDB is “ready to act as a multilateral partner – expanding climate financing, promoting the spread of green technologies, offering solutions in local currencies, and mobilizing the investments and capacities needed for infrastructure aligned with the Paris Agreement criteria.”

Paris Agreement and global order at risk

According to Dilma, defending the Paris Agreement is “a civilizational pact.” She warned that the goal of limiting global warming to 1.5°C is under threat and that the world risks seeing irreversible targets slip away. “The gap is not only numerical – it is existential,” she cautioned.

She criticized the disrespect shown by powerful nations toward the sovereignty of developing countries and reminded that climate efforts must recognize different national contexts. “Some still seem to believe that the law of the strongest should prevail,” she said, defending an order based on shared values and respect for international law.

“Climate change waits for no one and respects no borders,” Dilma declared, stressing that cooperation is the only viable path toward effective collective action.

“History will judge our generation not by the declarations we make, but by the determination with which we act,” she concluded.

BRICS Bank

Created in 2014, the New Development Bank is the main financial structure of the BRICS and has sought to consolidate itself as an alternative to the Bretton Woods model. Under Dilma’s leadership since 2023, the bank has strengthened its international presence through project expansion, bond issuance, and a focus on sustainable development.

The NDB currently has 11 member countries and has financed more than 120 projects totaling around USD 40 billion. Brazil alone accounts for 29 of those projects, with disbursements reaching USD 4 billion.

This article was first published by Brasil de Fato.

Singapore
Source: fulcrum.sg

Malaysia’s aspired BRICS membership would bring modest economic benefits but sizable political gains. Anwar should tread prudently and discreetly; pursuing BRICS vigorously could jeopardise Malaysia’s ties with the US and the West.

On the eve of China’s Victory Day Parade, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim notched up a diplomatic boost in his quest to elevate Malaysia’s participation in BRICS. At their bilateral meeting on 2 September, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated his full support for Malaysia’s participation as a full member of BRICS. 

But despite obtaining China’s support and intensely courting Russia during Russia’s BRICS presidency in 2024, Anwar’s efforts to bring Malaysia into the inner circle of BRICS have fallen short. Malaysia did not make the cut when BRICS was expanded to nine members last year. It was also a double blow when Malaysia lost out to Indonesia which became Southeast Asia’s first BRICS full member. These blows were softened when Malaysia was accorded the status of “partner country” in January 2025.

Notwithstanding these setbacks, Malaysia continues to cultivate BRICS. Last month, Anwar invited Brazil’s President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and South Africa’s President Matamela Cyril Ramaphosa to the 47^th ASEAN Summit as guests of the ASEAN Chair. However, Malaysia’s ambitions to play a larger role in BRICS are unlikely to materialise anytime soon due to the lack of consensus among BRICS’ founding members. On the one hand, China and Russia favour expanding the grouping to enhance their global leadership credentials and diplomatic clout. On the other hand, Brazil and India are wary that expansion would dilute their respective influence within the bloc. Given India’s reservations, it is unlikely to pursue this matter during its BRICS presidency next year. Thus, Malaysia may have to look beyond 2026 for any hope of becoming a full member.

Nevertheless, Malaysia remains upbeat on BRICS. Most recently, the Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry (MITI) underlined the importance of the country’s total trade with BRICS countries which amounted to 35.2 per cent of the country’s total global trade in 2024. However, MITI’s enthusiasm should be tempered with a deeper dive into the trade figures as there is a fair degree of “double counting.”

Overall, the ten BRICS countries accounted for 27.7 per cent of Malaysia’s total trade in 2022 (the latest data available from the World Bank). However, as noted by a Malaysian bank, China accounts for the lion’s share of Malaysia’s exports to and investments from BRICS countries. Indeed, the numbers would be less impressive if BRICS countries who are either ASEAN Member States (Indonesia) or have formal partnerships with Malaysia through ASEAN frameworks (Brazil, China, India, Russia, South Africa, and the United Arab Emirates) were left out of the equation. Removing this “circle of partners,” Malaysia’s total trade with the remaining BRICS countries (Egypt, Ethiopia, and Iran) whittles down to 0.3 per cent. 

The minimal gains from potential trade with BRICS countries beyond the “circle of partners” weakens the economic rationale for Malaysia to deepen its engagement with BRICS. There is also little added value of the BRICS membership in terms of access to the New Development Bank (NDB), as its facilities are open to all members of the United Nations (UN).

While the economic gains are either limited or unclear, the political benefits for Malaysia are easier to discern. Participation in BRICS would give Malaysia a platform to further its foreign policy agenda on issues such as Palestine and reforming global governance institutions (i.e., the UN, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank). Likewise, Malaysia could also solidify its diplomatic standing globally through its endorsement of BRICS declarations and statements. BRICS also raises Malaysia’s profile, especially that of its prime minister, as a voice of the Global South.

Being a BRICS partner country might be a blessing in disguise for Malaysia as it walks the tight rope of navigating the uncertainties of US foreign policy helmed by a mercurial president.

At the same time, the political downside is limited by the fact that Malaysia does not have a role in the decision-making process within BRICS. This enables Malaysia to distance itself from actions that the US or the West perceive to be antithetical to their interests such as de-dollarisation. More importantly, a lower profile in BRICS would also help to keep Malaysia out of US President Donald Trump’s gunsights as he has threatened to impose a 10 per cent tariff on countries aligning themselves with the anti-American politics of BRICS.

Regardless of whether the Trump administration casts a wider tariff net to ensnarl all BRICS participants — full members and partner countries alike — or limit the “punishment” to full members, it would be prudent to take Trump’s threats seriously. As the potential political costs from being on the wrong side of Trump outweigh the economic gains from BRICS, Malaysia would do well to keep its head low and limit its visibility and engagement. In this context, being a BRICS partner country might be a blessing in disguise for Malaysia as it walks the tight rope of navigating the uncertainties of US foreign policy helmed by a mercurial president. At the same time, Malaysia could leverage and explore new economic opportunities in BRICS away from the glare of the political spotlight.

Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

On November 6 and 7, the summit “BRICS+ Brazil 2025: Opportunities and Challenges” was held at the Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais (Belo Horizonte, Brazil). The event was organized jointly by the Russia–Latin America Observatory of the Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais (Ruslat-PUC Minas) and Kazan Federal University.

On November 7, the summit hosted a session on “BRICS+ Economic Cooperation: Opportunities in Latin America,” where participants discussed the challenges and prospects of economic and financial interaction within BRICS, as well as engagement between BRICS members and Latin American states, with a particular focus on the positions of Russia and Brazil.

Alexandra Terzi, Program Coordinator at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), delivered a presentation on Russia’s approach to economic cooperation with Latin America and BRICS. She outlined Moscow’s position toward the region, the key obstacles to expanding cooperation, opportunities for diversifying international settlements among BRICS countries, and the prospects for technological collaboration. She also offered recommendations for strengthening ties in both bilateral and multilateral formats.

Also presenting at the event were Antonio Cottas de Jesus Freitas, Deputy Head for International Finance and Economic Cooperation at the Secretariat for International Affairs of the Ministry of Finance of Brazil, and Daniela Sequecheis Vieira, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at the Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais and Co-founder of the Russia–Latin America Observatory.

The discussion included contributions from Fabiano Melnichuk, Professor of Political Science at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, instructor in the graduate program in International Strategic Studies, and member of the NEBRICS research group, as well as Luiza Calvette Costa, Director General of the Center for Integration and Cooperation between Russia and Latin America (CICRAL) in Brazil.

Russia
Source: russiancouncil.ru

On November 11, 2025, MGIMO University hosted the International Academic Conference “Expanding the Horizons of BRICS Cooperation.”

The event brought together leading experts, diplomats, and young scholars from BRICS countries and beyond. Over the course of the conference, participants presented analytical papers on the role of BRICS in the emerging multipolar world order, as well as on key issues in international economics, politics, and regional cooperation. The discussions were organized across seven thematic panels:

• “The Role of BRICS in the World Economy and Global Economic Governance: An African Perspective”
• “BRICS–ASEAN Synergy as a Driver of the Global South’s Strategy in a Multipolar World”
• “The Potential of BRICS in Deepening the Eurasian Security Complex: Military-Political Cooperation Between Central Asian States and BRICS Members”
• “Challenges and Prospects for Cultural and Educational Cooperation Among BRICS Countries”
• “Instruments and Institutions for Expanding Investment and Payment-Settlement Cooperation Among the Old and New BRICS Members of Greater Eurasia”
• “From Colonial Legacy to Global Identity: Self-Determination in the Global South”
• “Criminal-Law Policies of BRICS+ States in Protecting Traditional Values”

Within the panel “From Colonial Legacy to Global Identity: Self-Determination in the Global South,” RIAC Head of the Asia and Eurasia Program Yulia Melnikova delivered a presentation on “Collective Identity of Developing Countries and Discursive Continuity: From the Non-Aligned Movement to the Global South.” The report was co-authored with Vasily Vinogradov, Lecturer at MGIMO’s Department of Applied Analysis of International Problems. The session was moderated by Konstantin Sukhoverkhov, RIAC Program Manager.